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FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND OF THE PRESS
HUGH E. WILLIS*
What is the meaning of "freedom of speech and of the press"
under the United States Constitution? Law is a scheme of social
control for the delimitation of personal liberty in order to pro-
tect social interests.1 Government is the agency to whom the
sovereign people have delegated the power to exercise such social
control. The United States Constitution is an instrument
adopted by the sovereign people to establish the framework of
the federal government and to limit the power of the federal
government and the various state governments to exercise social
control.2 Under the United States Constitution, where does
social control over speech and the press end and personal liberty
begin? And where does freedom of speech and of the press end
and social control begin? Has the Constitution at the same time
strengthened both government and liberty and reconciled gov-
ernment with liberty?
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no
law . . . abridging the freedom of speech or of the press";
and the Fourteenth Amendment provides that "nor shall any
state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law." The United States Supreme Court has
held that freedom of speech and of the press are protected
against state action by the due process clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 3 Most state constitutions also have guaranties of
* See page 492 for biographical note.
1 Willis, Introduction to Anglo-American Law, 7-17.
2 Willis, The Doctrine of Sovereignty under the United States Consti-
tution, 15 Va. Law Rev. 437.
3 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Whitney v. Californim, 274
U. S. 357, 371 (1927); Fiske v. Kansas, 274 U. S. 380 (1927).
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freedom of speech and of the press. But, since the United
States Constitution protects this form of personal liberty against
both the action of Congress and the action of state legislatures,
the guaranties of state constitutions are superfluous. Neither
one of the provisions either creates or defines the privilege, but
both give the individual possessing it an immunity against gov-
ernmental action. Hence the words should have the same mean-
ing in both amendments, and our problem is to discover that
meaning.
It is true that Cooley was of the opinion that the First Amend-
ment was adopted in order to repudiate the English common law
of sedition and to give the people of the United States more
freedom of speech than was enjoyed by their English brethren
at that time;4 Madison, Jefferson and Hamilton were of the
opinion that the federal government had no power to legislate
upon the subject ; and it has recently been suggested that the
Fourteenth Amendment allows the states greater latitude than
the First Amendment allows Congress :6 but the Supreme Court
has finally held that the immunity against "abridging the free-
dom of speech or of the press" does not prohibit all legislatibn
by Congress, and there is a strong intimation that whatever
the states may do under the Fourteenth Amendment Congress
may do under the First Amendment.7 What, then, may the
states and the federal government do in the way of abridging
freedom of speech and of the press?
1. In the first place, freedom of speech and of the press
means immunity from both state and federal censorship (pre-
vious restraints) ;8 except a. as the courts are free to exercise
their equity powers in accordance with well settled principles ;9
b. as new enterprizes-like the movies-which do not give ex-
pressions of opinion may be controlled;1° and c. as the govern-
ment may exclude printed matter from the mails,1 prohibit in-
4 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, (8th Ed.) 901-2.
5 Elliott's Debates, vol. iv, pp. 571-3; Writings of Thomas Jefferson,
vol. viii, pp. 56-8; The Federalist, No. 84.
6 41 Harv. Law Rev. 528.
7 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204, 206 (1919).
s Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1907).
9 Gompers v. Buck Stove and Range Co., 221 U. S. 418 (1911); State
v. Guilford, 219 N. W. (Minn.) 770 (1928).
10 Mutual Film Corporation v. Industrial Commission of Ohio, 236 U. S.
230 (1915).
I Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U. S. 288 (1913); Masses Pub-
lishing Co. v. Patten, 246 Fed. 24 (1917).
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timidation by speech and writing 2 and the publication of indec-
ent matter,' 3 forbid government employees to engage in political
activity,14 and restrict publications dangerous to the conduct of
military operations in war time.1
In early English history there was little freedom of speech or
of the press. There is no mention of this privilege in the Peti-
tion of Right (1628), nor the Bill of Rights (1689), the great
forerunners of our bills of rights. Printing presses in the reign
of Henry VII could be used only by license of the king, and by
the time of Elizabeth the practice of using the license as a means
of controlling the character of publications was well established.
During the reign of James I, the Star Chamber took over the
regulation, or censorship, of the press, and made it an effective
engine for its evil genius. The Star Chamber was abolished in
1641, but Parliament continued the censorship of the press.
However, after the Revolution of 1688 its regulations gradually
fell into disuse, and when the last licensing act expired in 1694
it was never renewed. 16 Hence freedom from censorship be-
came a privilege of Englishmen long before our Revolutionary
War, when Blackstone's Fourth Book was published in 1769 he
wrote: 1 "The liberty of the press is indeed essential to the
nature of a free state; but this consists in laying no previous
restraints upon publications," and when the First Amendment
to our Constitution was adopted it certainly guaranteed freedom
from censorship at least.' s But this censorship means legal
censorship; it does not mean no censorship of any sort. Hence
a person is not protected against the social consequences of exer-
cising his legal privilege. It has been suggested that the guar-
antee of freedom of speech and of the press does not extend to
12 Thomas v. Railway Co., 62 Fed. 803 (1894).
13 People v. Most, 171 N. Y. 423 (1902); State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18
(1900).
14 Du-ffy v. Cooke, 239 Pa. St. 427 (1913).
1'Ex parte Vallandigham., I Wall (U. S.) 243 (1863).
10 Paterson, Liberty of Press and Speech, 44, 46, 77.
17 iv Black. Comm. 168.
18 Yet it was proposed to establish a censorship of the press in con-
nection with the Espionage Act, and the proposal was abandoned only for
an agreement of the newspapers for a voluntary censorship. The proposed
legislation would seem to have been unconstitutional. Carroll, Freedom of
Speech and of the Press in War Time, 17 Mich. Law Rev. 621, 622-9. The
Bill of Rights in the Constitution is not suspended by war. Ex pare
Milliga, 4 Wall (U. S.) 2 (1866).
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aliens, 19 but this suggestion is clearly wrong. Of course this
guarantee cannot be invoked to keep aliens from exclusion, 20 or
deportation by the federal government; but after admission to
this country resident aliens are entitled to the guarantee as
much as any one else, against both the states and the federal
government, because they are entitled to the protection of the
due process clause and the equality clause.21
Yet to the rule of immunity against censorship there are so
many exceptions that a great deal of the rule is no longer left.
In particular, there is the exception of equity jurisdiction. So
great is this exception that many fear that to allow it opens
the way for the complete overthrow of the rule, and the Minne-
sota case of State v. Guilford2= (now on appeal before the United
States Supreme Court) is enough to justify such fears. For
this reason and because they think censorship by a court of
equity is as bad as censorship by any other branch of the
government most of the early decisions in this country refused
by injunction to put previous restraints upon publications of
any kind. Yet the guaranty of freedom of speech and of the
press has never given immunity for contempt interfering with
the course of justice,24 and modern English cases directly and
modern American cases indirectly now grant injunctions to re-
strain libels, so that it must be taken for granted that some
censorship by the courts of equity is legal.25 So far as concerns
contempt there is no difficulty,26 for this was established law
before the First Amendment was adopted. So far as concerns
injunction, how much previous restraint is permissible? Does
19 Vance, 2 Minn. Law Rev. 239, 242.
20 United States v. Ju Toy, 198 U. S. 253 (1905).
21 Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886); Trua= v. Raich, 239
U. S. 33 (1915); Wong King v. United States, 163 U. S. 228 (1896).
22 219 N. W. (Minn.) 770 (1928).
23Brandreth v. Lance, 8 Paige 24 (1839); Howell v. Bee Pub. Co., 100
Neb. 39 (1916); Marx Clothing Co. v. Watson, 168 Mo. 133 (1902); Em
pire Theater Co. v. Cloke, 53 Mont. 183 (1917).
2 4 Huggonson's Case, 2 Atk. 469 (1742); Respublica v. Oswald, 1 Dall.
319 (1788). Is it due process of law to punish for indirect contempt of
court without making truth a defense and a trial before another judge?
2 Ind. Law J. 310-11.
25 Pound, Equitable Relief Against Defamation and Injuries to Per-
sonality, 29 Harv. Law Rev. 640, 665-8.
26 Willis, Punishment for Contempt of Court, 2 Ind. Law Jour. 309;
Fox, History of Contempt of Court.
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the Constitution confine the use of injunction to the class of
cases where it was used at the time of the adoption of the Con-
stitution, when it had not begun to be used to restrain libels, or
does it permit its use without limitation in any new classes of
cases? If the latter any use of words or any writing could be
made a nuisance, following the Minnesota precedent, and then
enjoined and thereby freedom of speech and of the press could
be destroyed. The answer to this question is that neither of
these positions is correct, but a middle position, that anything
may be restrained which due process of law permits. Before
any conduct can be made a nuisance or otherwise illegal, the
United States Supreme Court must be convinced that under the
due process clause there is sufficient social interest to make it
reasonable to do so. Probably the Supreme Court will permit
some extension both of the law of antecedent rights al.d the law
of remedial rights, but before it will do so it must be convinced
that this will be within the due process clause. This will permit
the courts to exercise some previous restraints, but it will still
leave intact the rule against censorship.20 1 The reasons for the
other exceptions are apparent. With these exceptions, the peo-
ple of the United States are guaranteed freedom of speech and of
the press immune from both state and federal censorship. The
notion once prevailed that this was all the protection that they
had, but that after publication they could be punished for any-
thing which the government desired to make illegal. Black-
stone2 7 and Holmes2 8 have helped to perpetuate this notion. But
now it is settled that freedom of speech and of the press means
something more than freedom from previous restraints.2 9 What
this further protection is may be stated as follows:
2. In the second place, freedom of speech and of the press
also includes immunity from liability after publication for any
publications which are not harmful as tested by the legal stand-
ards of the day, but not immunity from liability, a. if such lia-
bility was recognized at the time of the adoption of the consti-
tutional provision, or b. if such liability is imposed in a proper
exercise of the police power today. That is, freedom of speech
and the press means the privilege to speak and write what one
pleases, not only free from censorship (previous restraint) ex-
26 See notes 39-48.
27 iv Black. Comm. 168.
2 s Patterson v. Colorado, 205 U. S. 454, 462 (1907).
29 Coleman V. MaeLennen, 78 Kan. 711, 715; Schenck v. United States,
249 U. S. 47, 51 (1919).
INDIANA LAW JOURNAL
cept for equity, etc., but also free from liability therefor, unless
such speech or writing violates the social interests protected
either in 1791 or today.
At the time of the adoption of the First Amendment liability
was recognized at the common law for blasphemy, 30 obscenity, 81
contempt,32 or urging crimes 33 and defamation.34 However, it
must be remembered that the law of defamation gave an abso-
lute privilege to those conducting legislative, judicial and
military proceedings, and a qualified privilege to those under
duty to make the communication, with a common interest, speak-
ing in self-defense and making fair and accurate report of legis-
lative and judicial proceedings (after the judge was brought into
the case), and permission to make a fair and honest comment
and criticism of matters of public concern.3 5 The colonists not
only recognized as great liability as did England but no more
freedom of speech and of the press. It is said that the first
mention of free speech and free press occurred in Mason's fa-
mous Bill of Rights in 1776..36 Hence it must be assumed that
when the immunity of freedom of speech and of the press was
written into the Constitution it w~s in the sense in which it was
understood at the time, which was freedom from liability for
publications unless they amounted to blasphemy, obscenity, con-
tempt, defamation, or urging a crime. Was sedition (or revolt
against legitimate authority) also excepted? Probably it was
not. Fox's Libel Act was not passed until 1792; but Erskine and
others had carried on a long fight for freedom of speech and the
press, the people of England were clamoring for it, 3 7 and un-
doubtedly one reason for introducing into the First Amendment
the clause in regard to freedom of speech and of the press was to
get rid of the old English law of seditious libels.33
3o Reg. v. Taylor, 1 Ventris 293 (1687); Reg. v. Ramsay, 15 Cox. C. C.
231 (1883).
31 Rex v. Wilkes, 4 Burr. 2527 (1770).
32 Bagg's Case, 11 Rep. 93b (1615); Wilson's Case, 7 Q. B. 984 (1845).
33 Opinions in Abrawms v. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919) ; People V.
Most, 171 N. Y. 423 (1902).
34 Moore v. Meager, 1 Taunt. 39 (1807).
.35 'Hale, Law of the Press, 90, 130; City of Chicago v. Chicago Tribune,
307 Ill. 595 (1923).
36 4 Harv. Law Rev. 379; Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, (8th ed.)
881.
37 Burdick, Constitutional Law, 351.
38 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, (8th ed.) 898-908.
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But the immunity contained in the guarantee of freedom of
speech and of the press is not now so broad as this.39 The guar-
antee gives immunity from liability from no form of social con-
trol which is a proper exercise of the police power as understood
by the Supreme Court of the United States. In other words,
just as the Supreme Court controls what the courts may
enjoin before publication so it controls what the legislatures may
make punishable after publication. This is the doctrine of the
Supreme Court so far as concerns the Fourteenth Amendment.4
0
That makes freedom of speech and of the press vary as due
process of law varies. In its interpretation of the due process
clause the Supreme Court has not adopted the meaning which
the words "due process of law" had at the time of the adoption
of the constitutional provisions but whatever meaning it thinks
is reasonable at the time of the decision of each particular
case.41 Under this liberal method of interpretation it becomes
constitutional to create a new right of privacy,42 to re-create the
crime of sedition, 43 to forbid advertisements of lottery tickets
and false advertisements, 44 and to make any conduct illegal pro-
vided the Supreme Court can find a sufficient social interest to
be protected thereby.45 It is true that the Supreme Court has
generally adopted a strict (conservative) interpretation of the
various clauses in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution, making
them continue to mean just what they did at the time of their
adoption. But, since it has applied the liberal interpretation to
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and has
adopted the same method of interpretation as applied to the due
process clause of the Fifth Amendment ;46 and since it has made
the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment include
freedom of speech and of the press, 47 it must make the due
39 Schencik v. United States, 249 U. S. 41 (1919).
40 Gitlow v. New York, 268 U. S. 652 (1925); Fiske v. Kansas, 274
U. S. 380 (1927).
4' Willis, Due Process of Law under the United States Constitution, 74
U. of Pa. Law Rev. 331.
42 Pavesich v. New Eng. L. Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190 (1905).
43 Debs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211 (1919); Gilbert v. Minnesota,
254 U. S. 325 (1920).
44 State v. McKee, 73 Conn. 18 (1900); Lewis Pub. Co. v. Morgan, 229
U. S. 288 (1912).
45 Willis, Some Conflicting Decisions of the United States Supreme
Court, 13 Va. Law Rev. 280-287; 12 C. J. 952.
46 X A. B. A. 509.
47 Cases in note, 3, supra.
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process clause of the Fifth Amendment include it; and, if it does
this, it must give to freedom of speech and of the press in the
First Amendment the same meaning that it gives it under the
due process clause; and the cases under the Espionage Act, 48 to
be considered later, can be rationalized only on the theory that
the Supreme Court has already done this.
3. The question remaining, then, is, When is social control
of speech and the press today due process of law and not a
violation of the privilege of freedom of speech and of the press?
The answer is, When it is a proper exercise of the police power.
When is there a proper exercise of the police power? When the
Supreme Court can find a paramount social interest for any
specific legislation? When should it find such a social interest?
When the legislature forbids one person, or a few persons, to do
what would make the social order intolerable if. all were to do it.
When does this situation arise? In the historical cases of blas-
phemy, obscenity, contempt, urging crimes and defamation in
the modern and analogous cases, and in the case of seditious libel
where words give rise to unlawful acts. Discussion and criti-
cism of the form of government and of the conduct of those' in
authority by all would tend to make the social order better in-
stead of worse. Without them there would be no possibility of
progress in the form of government or means of getting rid of
corruption and inefficiency on the part of officials. When do
words give rise to unlawful acts? a. Either when they directly
urge or cause such acts, or b. where there is a clear and present
danger that they will cause such acts, or c. where they might
have an indirect or remote tendency to cause such acts. Which
one of these tests is the correct test? In Masses Pub. Co. v.
Patten49 Hand J. held that the first was the correct test, but on
appeal of the same case to the Circuit Court of Appeals5o (2nd)
Rogers J. held that the third was the correct test, and a great
many state courts in war time adopted this test. But in the
case of Schenck v. United States51 the United States Supreme
48 See notes 51 to 55. In passing on cases involving freedom of speech
or of the press the Supreme, Court does not distinguish between the First
Amendment and the Fourteenth Amendment, but in both cases seems to
talk in terms of the police power.
49 244 Fed. 535, 542 (1917).
50 246 Fed. 24, 38 (1917. Chafee, Freedom of Speech, discusses state
cases.
51249 U. S. 41 (1919).
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Court adopted the second test Is this case still the law? It has
not directly been overruled. The Frohwerk 2 case is in accord
with it. The Debs53 ease and the Abrams54 case can perhaps be
distinguished from it. But the cases of Pierce v. United States55
and Gitlow v. New York56 seem almost to have adopted the
indirect remote tendency test. In the Gitlow case the Supreme
Court distinguished between a statute which prohibited acts and
one which prohibited words, and intimated that where the stat-
ute prohibited Words the legislature had determined that such
utterances involved a substantive danger so that the question
whether any specific utterance of the sort prohibited actually
involves such a danger was not open to consideration. Yet in
Fiske v. K ansas5 7 the Supreme Court decided that a valid statute
was not enough, but that if the utterances could not be consti-
tutionally punished a conviction would be reversed even though
the words had been held to be within the statute by the state
court; and in Whitney v. Californi5 s it indicated that a legisla-
tive declaration that language involves sufficient danger is not
conclusive but will be held invalid if arbitrary and unreasonable.
If remote indirect tendency were to be the test of the constitu-
tionality of social control of speech and the press, it might as
well be admitted first as last that there would be no such thing
as "freedom of speech or of the press." But it now looks as
though the Supreme Court were going to protect this form of
personal liberty against social control either by previous re-
straint or by subsequent liability unless the Supreme Court
itself-passing both on the utterance and the statute-thinks
such control reasonable (and perhaps in the case of sedition as
judged by the test of clear and present danger).59
52 Frohwerk v. United States, 249 U. S. 204 (1919).
5sDebs v. United States, 249 U. S. 211 (1919).
54Abrams i. United States, 250 U. S. 616 (1919).
55 252 U. S. 239 (1920).
56 268 U. S. 652 (1925).
57274 U. S. 380 (1927).
58 274 U. S. 357, 371 (1927).
59 Chafee, Freedom of Speech; Schofield, Freedom of the Press in the
United States, 9 Pub. Am. Soc. Soc. 67; Carroll, Freedom of Speech and of
Press in Wartime, 17 Mich. Law Rev. 621; Chafee, Freedom of Speech in
War Time, 32 Harv. Law Rev. 932; Wallace, Constitutionality of Sedition
Laws, 6 Va. Law Rev. 385; Taft, Freedom of Speech and the Espionage
Act, 7; Hall, Free Speech in War Time, 21 Col. Law Rev. 526; Wigmore,
Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Thuggery in Wartime and Peacetime,
14 Ill. Law Rev. 539.
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Do the decisions of the United States Supreme Court give too
much freedom of speech and of the press, or too much social
control? In war time the dominant hysterical majority thought
they gave too much freedom of speech and of ,the press. In
peace time the dominant majority, regaining its sanity, is be-
ginning to think that they give too much social control. The
press, in particular, is becoming restive and apprehensive over
a rule under which Arkansas and Tennessee legislate against
the teaching of evolution, the city of Boston censors plays and
Minnesota enjoins newspapers as nuisances. The writer is in-
clined to sympathize with the attitude of the press when he looks
at the situation as a whole, but when he looks at any particular
part of it he is inclined to approve of it and not to desire to have
the law changed. Is the test for reasonableness under the police
power wrong? No. Assuming that the Supreme Court has
adopted the "clear and present danger" test the writer would
suggest no change. Did the Supreme Court make a mistake in
extending due process to include freedom of speech? No, not
if due process of law is to be extended to include any substantive
law. Of course, if the Supreme Court had not extended due
process to any substantive law the First Amendment would have
applied only to the federal government, and the Supreme Court
might have limited its meaning to the meaning it had at the
time of its adoption when either social control over sedition
(where the worst abuses have arisen) would have been excluded
or nothing but censorship would have been excluded (which
would have made the situation worse than it is now) ; but the
state legislatures and courts would have been uncontrolled ex-
cept by their own constitutions, and the writer would rather
trust the Supreme Court than state legislators and judges. Has
the Supreme Court made a mistake in permitting previous re-
straints by courts with equity powers? No. So far as this is
accomplished through the power to punish for contempt, while
some reform of the law of indirect contempt is doubtless desir-
able, it is unthinkable to take away from the courts the power
to punish either for direct or for indirect contempt of court.
So far as concerns the use of injunctions, it is also useless to
rail. If due process of law is going to be extended to include
freedom of speech and the courts are going to have the power to
determine what is due process of law after publication and to
impose liability, it is no worse for the same courts to determine
what is due process of law before publication and to prevent
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wrong-doing, unless all injunctive relief is to be abolished, which
again is something unthinkable. There are as cogent reasons
for protecting by injunction rights of personality as there are
for protecting rights of property. Are the other exceptions to
the rule of no previous restraints justifiable? The writer is not
prepared to say that they are not. Hence, if we are getting too
little freedom of speech and of the press and too much social
control of them, the writer feels that the remedy lies, not in
changing the law, but in obtaining a Supreme Court whose per-
sonnel will guarantee a good application of the rule of rea-
sonableness.
